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In this work we compare social clusters with spin clusters and compare different properties. We
also try to compare phase changes in market and labor stratification with phase changes of spin
clusters. Then we compare the requisites for redrawing the boundaries of social clusters with respect
to energy minimization and efficiency. We finally do a simulation experiment and show that by
choosing suitable link matrices for agents and attributes of the same and of different agents it is
possible to have at the same time behavior similar to chaos or punctuated equilibrium in some
attributes or fairly regular oscillations of preferences for other attributes, using greatest utility or
efficiency as a criterion for change in conflicting social networks with different agents having different
preferences with respect to the attributes in the agent himself or with similar attributes in other
agents.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In economics, every agent behaves rationally to maxi-
mize his or her utility curves. However, in an imperfect
world, not all the people we know look rational. Phe-
nomena like war and spite look very contrary to what a
rational person would do to maximize his or her material
needs.
The reason human interactions are possible, and it is
also possible to have a coherent system of trade and ne-
gotiation is explained by the idea that a common set of
needs and understanding are shared by the majority of
people. Classical economics deals with this set of needs
and formulates equations for every possible deal. How-
ever, it fails to account for the so called irrational human
behaviors. If a set of scientific data observed by most
and possible to be experimentally verified by the major-
ity did not exist, social networks would perish. However,
together with the existence of a network with a common
set of knowledge, exist phenomena like revolutions, ha-
tred, riots, and many basic instincts not explainable by a
concrete set of knowledge. Attempts have been made to
justify irrational behaviors as weak, inconsistent or cul-
turally inferior and evolution-wise unfit. However, in this
paper, we try to understand the fine structure of human
perceptions and needs to model possible chaotic and an-
nealing behaviors of social lattices from a spin glass point
of view without any a priori bias towards a certain logic
system successful in adapting with nature at a certain
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time point.
Previously, we have tried explaining the non quantifi-
able human needs [1] and the variations in utility curves
by taking Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem [2] into ac-
count. In discrete math only the states 0 and 1 exist for
switching. In the real world, of course, there can be many
states in between corresponding to a continuum. How-
ever, one can also consider only extreme conflicting cases
that are opposites in a simplified picture. We have argued
that although strategies to maximize needs might be ra-
tional, the needs themselves might not be a ”common
rational” set of constants. As any logic system is based
on a set of axioms that are by themselves not provable
within the logic system itself, and the axioms or sets of
information are acquired by each agent individually by
interacting with its environment and other agents, not
all agents necessarily need to share the same set of ax-
ioms or needs that they tend to optimize. Some needs,
however, might be very common and ”material” whereas
some other needs are quite hard to quantify. We try
to explain the branchings of these spin clusters to chaos
and annealing by taking this unprovability theorem into
account. We argue that although majority of the peo-
ple must agree on a majority of utilities and perceptions,
fine structures in variables that define agents and their
perceptions or utilities connected with other variables in
a lattice may cause chaotic behavior or annealing when
placed in an interacting lattice.
In our simplified model, we describe each agent as an n
tuple of qualities and needs. We call each of these entries
in an ”array” possessed by the agent as a variable. We
start with a set of basic quantifiable needs that an agent
tends to maximize in this paper. We also define a set of
2variables that an agent possesses that he/she can use in
order to maximize the needs. The second set will include
skills that the agent can trade and calculating efficiency
to interpret the other agents’ needs as subsets. The third
set will define a set of easily discernible variables that
other agents can use to mark or tag an agent. We can
then describe each agent as a multivariable spin state,
and investigate how it interacts in a social cluster and
with nature.
II. THE DEFINITION OF ”SELF”
We define an agent’s ”self” as an array of variables
possessed by the agent. In our model, the idea of self,
instead of being an object contained within a body, will
be rather a slowly weakening concept of the self similar
variables. We use the term slowly weakening because the
idea of ”self” decreases as another array contains fewer
variables in common and also the strength of the ”bonds”
as a function of physical or need wise distance. By need-
wise distance we mean the placement of a variable in a
position where it can be influenced by the agent or from
where it can influence the agent. This distance is not
necessarily solely a geographic distance. As a result, our
model of ”self” is a fractal like model with a basic array of
variables forming the shortest unit. As we include more
and more self similar variables from other agents placed
in a cluster but also containing dissimilar variables, the
idea of self weakens.
The ”existence” axiom is related to a concept of ”self”.
But in this paper, we propose making the definition fuzzy.
Networks arise because people associate with others who
are similar to themselves in some respect [6]. In our
model, each agent can be defined as finitely or infinitely
many variables in an n-tuple or an array. An agent will
identify the array with the definition of self. However,
the variables are connected to the concept of ”self” with
certain weight factors which maybe modifiable. An agent
chooses to maximize the utility curves for him”self”. He
may choose to perpetuate different variables related to
”self” with more energy invested. This preference, again,
is complex, and may not be definable by simple functions.
However, the other agents in the cluster also possess an
array of variables and may or may not have the same
value as the first agent in each of the variable slot. We
can say that an agent will ”identify” with other agents
who possess similar values for the variables. This ex-
tended fuzzy idea of ”self” may create some loosely or
strongly defined clusters where the agents relate with self-
similar structures in specific variables. The affinity with
agents may also be a function of time, as which vari-
ables an agent would tend to find more important may
be a dynamic function of time. When an agent invests
in perpetuating ”self”, we thus add a correction term to
the self that includes other agents possessing similar vari-
ables. However, granted that no two agents are similar in
every possible variable, any investment in perpetuating
other agents with similar variables also comes with the
cost of perpetuating some dissimilar variables.
These affinity clusters may be modeled as follows: We
can describe an agent as an array of variables. The vari-
ables may have discrete 0 or 1 values or continuous values
within a range. Within the social lattice, we can say that
each of these spin type variables is coupled to the similar
variable slot of other agents. The coupling will depend on
a coupling strength, which might be a function of time,
and also on the values of the variables in the two agents.
What is interesting here is that the agents may or may
not have knowledge of the proper values for the variables.
So each variable in an agent has an actual value and also
a value perceived by the other agent/s. The individual
utility curve can get distorted because of this ”affinity
factor” as the corrected utility would be the utility of the
individual corrected by a weighted utility of the affinity
group. The affinity factor will reflect an agent’s percep-
tion of other agents’ variable values. A miscalculation
or bluffing on other agents’ parts will cause the agent
to invest energy in perpetuating dissimilar or contradic-
tory variables. However, each member within a known
affinity group will have the individual affinity and the
corrected group affinity both playing a role in the util-
ity curve. Moreover, the group utility is a factor that is
shared by all members of the group, and each individ-
ual will tend to utilize the other agent’s affinity points
to gain an increase in utility at no or little expense of
ones own cost of entropy. As a result, it might be prof-
itable to ”net utility” to invest in increasing other agents’
affinity utility factor. Again, investments made in max-
imizing group affinity utilities from others will result in
an expenditure within a closed subdomain. If the to-
tal amount of investment, or energy to be spent is kept
constant, an increased investment within the subdomain
will reduce investments in games with other subdomains
and with nature. As a result, agents in a subdomain
playing against each other with a large weight factor to
increase each others group affinity factor will have less to
invest in games outside the subdomain. Again, bluffing
about ones variables might be a strategy an agent uses
to gain group affinity points from agents with dissimilar
variables with no expenditure of group affinity from the
agent’s own side. We can check out by simulation cases
where agents who are indeed sharing affinity variables
are put together in a cluster, and clusters where some
concealing agents are mixed.
The other interesting property of this notion of ”self”
is that the variables in the unit array are dynamic. As
a result, the idea of self will change with time as exter-
nal variables change. However, as the basic array gets
modified, so does a person’s perception of ”self” and the
affinity clusters that appear as weaker versions of ”self”
also redraw their boundaries.
3III. VARIABLES AND THEIR EVOLUTION
A. Knowledge, Preferences
Knowledge is a set of information that an agent obtains
by interacting with nature and other agents. Knowledge
is obtained by symmetry breaking and provides an agent
with a rule or a measurement that is in a collapsed state
and can be used in the future to play against nature [11].
A knowledge or piece of information can be used to sat-
isfy the agent’s preferences of what should be done in
the future. Although knowledge can be shared among
agents, so that agents can decide on a possible set of
largely overlapping common knowledge, the preferences
about how these knowledge pieces should be used to in-
teract with nature is not necessarily a common set of
knowns. Preferences or utilities, may vary in importance
or weight from agent to agent. Some of the utilities are
fixed, and some are not. Pieces of knowledge are com-
bined with resources that can be explained as specific
sites of interactions with nature can be used to change
nature. Given a finite amount of resources, with many
possibilities of investment in future games, the ”choice”
of the optimum investment remains unfixed. Agents use
the set of knowledge they possess to interact with nature
using the resources to change nature to accommodate
their preferences. In appendix A, we discuss a theoretical
model for a group of agents possessing a largely overlap-
ping knowledge and preferences.
B. Skill and Aptitude Variables
The interactions of the agents with nature in order to
modify nature depend on both skill and aptitude. An
agent can modify his ability to interact with nature by
repeatedly interacting with nature. It is a mechanism
of adaptation by which the agent learns to optimize his
efforts to interact in a certain way. However, the in-
nate ability of an agent to interact in a certain way or
perform a certain deed can be contributed as talent or
aptitude. An agent with no aptitude will need to invest
a higher amount of time and energy to master a certain
task. We can model aptitude as follows: We can assume
that each agent is born with a group of preference curves
that are slightly different from other agents’ preference
curves. The curves can be modified by interacting with
nature, and can be brought to roughly resemble another
person’s preference curve distribution. However, adapta-
tion and learning will create an exact match with another
distribution very rarely with the increase in number of
variables and steps in learning process involved with a
certain distribution. A certain distribution, gain, can be
optimized to interact with nature in specific ways and
produce specific results. A certain agent’s aptitude for
a certain job may also be interrelated with his or her
aptitude for other specific jobs as performing a certain
group task optimally may require sharing one or more
preference variables. However, these fine tunings are very
rarely going to match an exact optimized result need,
and can be taken as a random function of chance over all
agents.
C. Self and Mutability with respect to Fitness
An agent will try to perpetuate him”self” and in order
to do so, he will play against nature and against other
agents. We tried formulating this game in our first paper.
However, while playing against nature, a certain set of
variables will be fitter at a certain time space point than
other. An agent will try to dynamically change the idea
of ”self” to make himself fittest to perpetuate. On other
words, an agent will either change variables to be placed
at an optimal condition with respect to nature, or change
nature to fit himself best. As a second strategy, an agent
will try to include other agents with optimal variables in
the cluster of ”extended self”. This can be done so by
mating with an agent with the coveted variable to include
the variable in the agent’s own array.
D. Optimized variables and Bluffing
The agents use their set of variables to play against
nature and also against the other agents competing for a
finite resource offered by nature. So although an agent
may be interested in utilizing another agent’s more opti-
mized variable, they are also playing against each other
to maximize the perpetuation of their own variables. Aa
certain time point, an agent may not have a set of vari-
ables that are all optimal with respect to nature. Agents
can at that point form a network where more optimized
variables of one agent are used by another agent in re-
turn for the other more optimized variables of the second
agent. However, the possession of more optimized vari-
ables puts an agent in a position with higher bargaining
power. The game at this point can very easily be mod-
eled in the same fashion as several agents with cards with
higher or lower values. An agent may show the value of
the card before placing a bid in the game or bluff. In a pi-
oneering theory on game theory [3] the authors argue how
bluffing is an essential strategy of any such game. Simi-
larly, in the game of social lattice, equilibrium points are
achieved by bluffing and trying to interpret the correct
optimizations of the variables possessed by other agents.
The inclusion of an optimized variable in an agent’s array
by mating with an agent possessing that variable, also in-
cludes variables previously not in that array and not op-
timized with respect to nature in the array of the agent.
This new array will for a new definition of self and will
thus isolate the agent from its older cluster defining self
if the newly introduced variables are dissimilar enough
with the first set of variables. As a result, an agent not
wishing to break his former ”self” cluster might as well
find strategies to make use of the other agent’s optimized
4variable without making the second agent part of him
”self”.
E. Correlated and Uncorrelated Variables and
Their Interpretations
Variables may be obtained by genetic inheritance or by
interactions with nature and with other agents. Again,
the variables an agent possesses may or may not be cor-
related. Moreover, they may appear to be correlated
if they are placed in a certain environment for a cer-
tain time period and then become uncorrelated when the
agent is removed from the environment. For example, if
placed in a certain environment that requires optimiza-
tion of two variables for survival, an agent may develop
specializations in two factors. However, if the agent is re-
moved from the environment, it is possible for one of the
variables to become randomized while the other remains
fixed. Again, some variables may be dominant and others
recessive. As a result, mating among specialized agents
and non-specialized agents may produce off-springs that
are specialized in one variable but not specialized in the
other.
F. Interpretation of Variables
Some variables may be easy to understand whereas
others may require a heavier investment of time and en-
ergy for interpretation. We can say that some of the
variables are easily visible but others are not. However,
if two variables are ”assumed” to be correlated, inter-
preting the more easily visible one saves time and energy
that otherwise would have been spent in interpreting the
second one. This process may be efficient as long as the
two variables are in reality very closely correlated, and
the risk of the variables becoming uncorrelated is very
small.
G. Difference with a Parochial Cluster
Networks arise partly because agents choose to asso-
ciate with others who are similar to themselves in some
great respect [6]. In Persistent Parochialism: Trust and
Exclusion in Ethnic Networks [4], the viability of ethnic
clusters and parochialism is described in detail. We pro-
pose a model similar in some aspects with the parochial
model here, but also in terms of the spin glass model.
Variables that are easy to fake and variables that are
difficult to fake are also taken into account. However,
the main dissimilarity between the Bowles model and
our model is that instead of taking parochial networks
as networks where the fixed variables act as markers for
shared beliefs and information only, we define an agent
as an array of variables where all the entries add up to
the definition of ”self” and the agent finds strong or weak
affinity with other agents depending on the weight of the
variable in the agent’s definition of ”self”. As a result,
the agents do not form a network based on more easily
identifiable ethnic qualities because of the expectation
of shared information to enhance cooperation only. The
agents will form positive, negative or neutral bonds with
all other agents depending on the value of the variable at
each variable slot. However, the bonds will be weighted
by the agent’s definition of self. In order to be success-
ful, a parochial network must be very small so that the
information structure is efficient [5]. However, in order
to play in the entire pool of agents and with nature, a
stratification of skills in the cluster is required if the clus-
ter is to be self sufficient. However, the skill depends on
both innate ability and training. We will be discussing
the idea of aptitude and skill with respect to our model
later. Although training might be imposed on agents by a
small parochial cluster, a wide distribution of innate skill
aptitudes is statistically less and less probable in smaller
and smaller clusters. The other point to be taken into
account is that as agents from different clusters come into
contacts, beliefs and utility curves tend to get modified
and the fixed ethnic tag and the easily flippable beliefs
can get less correlated and the tag can be used to fake
beliefs. The other point that might cause the agents to
desert the cluster is mating, which can make the markers
uncorrelated. The choice of mates is not the same as the
choice of business partners where long term commitments
are always necessary. Also, mating can offer a deserting
agent security in the new cluster so that his self similar
variables can get a guarantee to perpetuate there. Be-
cause of all these reasons, we propose clustering where all
variables including beliefs and utility curves act as pos-
sible reasons for bonding, and one agent can be loosely
affiliate with more than one clusters. The affinity clusters
are dynamic, and hence so are an agent’s utility curves.
The other main difference with the parochial model that
takes into account only the ease and cost effectiveness of
the information system of a parochial cluster is that, al-
though there are bonds that take into account similarity
in beliefs that account for ease in exchanging informa-
tion, our model also takes into account similarities in
genotypical properties, something that accounts for un-
conditional love for children and close ties with siblings
even they grow up physically isolated and share totally
different views.
H. Optimization of Energy
Each agent in the network tries to attain the maximum
utility at the expense of minimum energy invested. We
can define a variable similar to free energy to define this
term. The agent will tend to cause minimum change of
entropy of his own environment for the maximum possi-
ble gain of utility. The cost in this game is entropy. We
can define this situation by a mathematical optimization
equation with a constraint to minimize entropy. This can
5be achieved if we can find a variable v such that utility is
directly or positively correlated with v whereas entropy
is negatively correlated with v and then we find the max-
imum of utility - entropy by varying on v. Let us call this
quantity (utility - entropy) to be net utility. As each of
the agents maximize their net utility, the social cluster
reaches an equilibrium as no agent can gain more net
utility by shifting from that position. This situation is
similar to reaching a Nash equilibrium in game theory.
The situation is also similar to a spin lattice reaching one
of its stable phases.
I. Flipping of Variables: Critical net utility and
Correlation among variables
The variables can be modeled similar to an array of
spins coupled to one another with weight factors. These
weight factors can be updated as more information is fed
from the environment and other agents. An agent will
tend to maximize the net utility on each variable by tak-
ing the weight factor into account. When the net utility
in one variable is lower than a threshold, there may be
a flip in the preference. A flip in one of the variables
again affects the other variables depending on the cou-
pling. This might be described as follows. As an agent’s
preference shifts, the agent may need to modify his/her
skill set to maximize the new preference. Also, if the
flipped preference creates a conflict with other prefer-
ences, flipping may continue until a stable state with no
contradictions or a minimal contradiction is achieved. As
a result, the cost of flipping a variable will be the cost of
flipping all the variables that are strongly coupled to it.
The threshold for flipping can be explained as follows. In
order to flip a variable, a certain amount of energy needs
to be spent. This energy includes the effect of decoupling
from any affinity cluster that was based on the value of
the variable, energy spent in loss of credibility etc. Loss
of credibility can be explained as the fluctuations in the
interactions with other spins because of an unstable state
of the spin. Agents in an affinity cluster will contribute
there share of affinity utilities to the agent only when his
variable value is credible. Once an agent flips his variable
and joins another cluster, the agents of the new cluster
will need to calculate whether the flipped variable is true
or bluffed, or whether it is a temporary fluctuation, since
a temporary fluctuation will not make the agent incur
the cost of flipping all the coupled variables. The other
part of the flipping cost is the physical cost incurred to
flip a variable: the time and energy spent. Also, flipping
a variable would mean that an agent will be placed in a
pool with other agents with a new similar variable and
agents possessing contradictory variables, if the variable
is an axiom, will be acting against it. Flipping in one
variable might also be economically efficient if flipping in
one variable optimizes the utility in some other variables
in the agents array substantially, so that the flipping cost
is expected to be compensated for by future increase in
utilities in other variables. As an agent’s variable flips,
agents coupled strongly with the flipped agents on other
variables may flip the certain variable. This will depend
on if the flip weakens the total coupling of the flip agent
from the affinity cluster, and if the decoupling results in a
loss of the affinity utility which is larger than the flipping
threshold. Again, an agent with a flipped variable may
bluff in order not to lose the affinity utility share. The
spin-spin interaction energy among agents can be mod-
eled as
∑
i Jijksisj where Jijk is the coupling constant
between spin k of agent i and that of agent j. Flipping
the spin will change the sign of the interaction energy.
However, a new term will be added with the flip, which
will be the energy spent in making the spin flip look cred-
ible. Also, the internal energy spent will be the sum of
the flipping energy all flipped spins coupled to the agent.
If the internal spins are coupled with, weight factors, then
it might be sufficient to flip only leading term spins. How
many internal spins will be flipped can be decided by the
following equation: We model the flipping energies as fol-
lows. The variables are coupled to similar variables with
other agents or the variables may also be coupled with
nature. If the variables are coupled with other variables
in nature, the total energy in flipping will depend on
the number of agents coupled together in a network, and
also the weight placed on the variable. Also, the energy
required to flip a variable will depend on the internal cou-
plings. Let us assume that the external flipping energies
are the product of three variables:
1. a coupling weight Jij , that takes into account the
weight given to the certain variable by agent i Jij is the
same for all j for a specific i, as the weight would depend
specifically on agent i’s valuation,
2. the number of agents in the network, or the total
number of nodes in the cluster carrying the same variable,
3. a distance factor that explains whether agent j’s
variable have effect on gent i’s variable and a constant
flipping energy Eflip. If, on the other hand, the variables
are coupled to nature, the situation is a little different. In
the cluster with other agents, all agents are assumed to
have the capability of influencing other agents. However,
when a certain variable is coupled with nature, the flip-
ping energy can be very high. Nature, here, compared
to a large heat bath with which the cluster is held in
contact, and the thermodynamic fluctuations of the clus-
ters will depend on the spin-spin interactions with the
other agents, whereas, the equilibria in some other vari-
ables will be predetermined by the external environment,
determined by nature. This huge ”average” behavior of
the large bath will determine the unflippable variables or
utilities that an agent cannot do away with. Examples
are eating and shelter. However, variations on what to
eat and what to use as shelter are not globally fixed, but
depend on local variables and agent to agent interactions,
and these variables can be flipped.
6J. The ”difficult to flip” variables and mating
The variables that are difficult to flip can also get
reshuffled from one generation to another by mating. A
network that tends to optimize efficiency by heavily rely-
ing on fixed variables to deduce inherent values and faith
is also prone to get deceived by ”fake markers” carried
by progeny of agents belonging to the network. In a one
generation game where deserters can easily be tagged by
their markers and punished, the fixed markers can be an
efficient choice to enforce homogeneity of values within
the cluster. However, as the markers diffuse and values
get uncorrelated, the forced belief in the correlation can
produce disastrous results.
Let us imagine a cluster where several sub-clusters
marked by some fixed variables operate within the sys-
tem. Let us also assume that bargaining powers of the
agents are based on his/her placement in the labor mar-
ket, and also that the labor market is strictly controlled
by the fixed variables, so that a certain job is done only
by an agent carrying a certain variable. This situation
can put certain sub-clusters to a more advantageous posi-
tion as they receive a high bargaining power, and they are
assured of their variables remaining in a high bargaining
power situation over generations if diffusion of markers
is rendered unacceptable. The situation will create quite
a few inefficiencies:
1. An agent’s aptitude variables may not get propa-
gated in the same way as the fixed variables. A guarantee
of a placement in the labor market based on an external
marker will also at as a lack of incentive for individual
agents to invest in acquiring the skill. As a result, total
competence in the skill will go down for the cluster.
2. The lack of incentive for the agents placed in lower
bargaining power categories to be efficient.
3. Dynamic nature of the important skill as the game
with nature and other cluster evolves. Labor reorgani-
zation might be required to adapt to a dynamic game.
However, ac luster that heavily replies on fixed variables
to assign labor preferences will find it costly to reorga-
nize quickly, as all systems taking the fixed variables into
account to account for labor must be updated.
4. Two dissimilar variables even kept in the strictest
social rules but in a physically connected space will dif-
fuse. We elaborate diffusion in a later section.
The other aspect to be taken into account is inter-
cluster games, where because of mating, it might be pos-
sible to fake one or more fixed variables.
The other interesting property of a cluster composed
of more than one sub-clusters held together, even if there
is no strict fixed variable labor stratification is the fol-
lowing:
The subcomponents of the cluster will depend on one
another, but will also need to be held together by a suffi-
cient number of similar variables that are highly weighted
and also have a high flipping cost. However, if the
sub-clusters differ in one or more highly weighted vari-
ables, they will also compete against one another when
resources become scarce, as each sub-cluster will prefer
perpetuating members of the own clusters that are simi-
lar in more variables. However, if labor assignments are
made within the entire cluster itself and if all members
are allowed to come into close contacts, the members of
different sub-clusters will have their fixed variables dif-
fuse with generations. However, any subgroup possessing
a variable that can be initially associated with a higher
bargaining power will be reluctant to give up the bar-
gaining power unless the other fixed variables from agents
from other sub clusters also hold a bargaining power with
an equal degree. However, with diffusion, the fixed and
skill variables will get disjoint and unless the variable
interpretation system is totally reorganized, the wrong
agent will be affiliated with the wrong skills. Now, let
us assume that the sub-clusters are held together for a
long enough time without the cohesive variable being dis-
turbed, and the agents’ fixed variables diffuse to create
a cluster where no fixed variables can separate one agent
from another. What does remain interesting at this part
is the evolution of the set of preferences held by the differ-
ent sub-domains. Each of the subgroups are assumed to
hold a set of common axioms in the beginning that lead
to a set of cohesive decision preferences. Now each of the
sub-domains must have at least some axioms that are
contradictory to the axioms of the agents in the other
sub-domains. Although genetically fixed variables can
diffuse with no contradictions, diffusion of logical systems
need not be without creating logical systems that con-
tain contradictory decisions within the logical structure.
Although initially the contradictory axioms might carry
little weight in the correlated spin structure, these weight
factors are subject to modification with an evolving sys-
tem placed with other clusters and also with nature. As
contradictory axioms start carrying higher weights, the
cluster will become less cohesive, and it is also possible to
have weakly correlated genetic markers and contradictory
logic systems or a cluster with simply self-contradictory
logical systems. When the sub-clusters have unequal la-
bor bargaining power, one sub-cluster might decide to
flip its low cost preference variables in trade of a partner-
ship and for a logically cohesive cluster. However, since
the axioms underlying the decision preferences cannot be
proved within the logical system, as long as the diffusing
clusters have equal or close to equal bargaining power,
one set of logic tree cannot be preferably replaced by the
other. Again, an agent willingly flipping his preference
variables will signal a lack in bargaining power.
We try to simulate a lattice which is initially consist-
ing of several sub-domains consisting an exclusive set of
genetically fixed variables and an exclusive set of logic
systems, but with equal and different skill bargaining
powers. We let the markers and the decision preferences
diffuse slowly. The simulation results and the equation
are discussed in the later version of the paper.
7K. Rate of Change of Utility
The rate of change of utility is used for a corrective
feedback mechanism. A sudden rate of change in a util-
ity will imply either a sudden change in flip in others
leading to a sudden decrease in the agent’s utility, or a
sudden need for reorganization of variables. A sudden
need for flipping one or more variables require a large
investment in flipping energies. A sudden change in util-
ity in a variable will lead to the agent to adjust weight
factors in other variables while trying to maintain the sta-
tus quo. Also, a sudden change in utility in one variable
due to actions in part of other agents will lead to the
acceptance of defection or betrayal if the agent adapts
to the change quickly. Any cluster must have a built
in mechanism to punish defectors. An agent interprets
other agents’ weights in preferences by looking at past
data sets of actions, and a data point corresponding to
an act of defection or betrayal will lead to other agents
in a position to gain from leaving the cluster to provide
an incentive to leave.
L. Weight Factors of Variables
Each agent can be described as an array of an infinite
number of variables. We consider cases where a finite
number of variables carry a changeable but large portion
of the total weights. On the other hand, if the weight fac-
tors were distributed thinly among many variables, which
are uncorrelated among agents, no clustering would oc-
cur. However, we consider the weight factors to be also
dynamic. Let us consider n leading variables among m
agents. Let us say that agent i has a weight for vari-
able k to be wik. In that case agent i will also invest
wik proportion of its energy in optimizing in variable k.
Also, agent i will form positive or negative bonds with
other agents which will contribute to the agent’s ”affinity
utility” as a function of wik. However, if agent j has a
weight wjk for variable k, agent k will gain from agent
j’s affinity utility as a function of wjk. Also, flipping a
variable k will affect an agent as a function of wik and∑
j wjk and the alignment of k in other agents.
The weights come into play significantly in the follow-
ing way: The agent can only afford a limited amount of
change in entropy, or in other words, the agent has only
a certain amount of time and energy available for spend-
ing. This constraint will be taken into account when net
utilities are maximized. The agent will start at optimiz-
ing the highest weighted utility, or existence, and will go
down the tree by optimizing utilities that are connected
to self by taking the weight factor and the net utility into
account. The variable to be looked at is the utility scaled
by the weight factor with the entropy factor subtracted.
When several nodes are reached from one node that rep-
resent the same net utility within a certain error range,
with the weighted utility put in, the nodes are pursued
in parallel as we go down the utility tree.
M. Weight Factors, Risk Factors and Integration
over time
We assume that agents placed in a social lattice will
play against one another and also against nature to op-
timize their utilities. However, with every game, we can
associate a risk factor. For example, if several agents are
placed in a market, and each of them values two differ-
ent commodities differently, each of the agents will try
to deduce the other agent’s valuation in order to maxi-
mize his/her own profits in the futures market. The other
agent’s valuation can be guessed if enough information is
collected about the second agent’s past decisions. How-
ever, the utility curve of the second agent is also sub-
ject to change. As each of the agents interacts with the
environment separately, they acquire more and more in-
formation, and their needs may reflect a changed set of
information possessed by them. The importance of a cer-
tain utility may also go down or up as new information is
added to an agent’s information system. This possibility
of change can be lumped into a risk factor.
How a certain agent calculates this risk factor also af-
fects his/her decisions. Again, calculating the risk factor
or possible future actions requires an investment of time
and energy. Since each agent tends to minimize the en-
ergy spent, how much energy an agent will invest in inter-
preting the second agent’s future actions will also depend
on the first agent’s interpretation of the ”importance” of
the second agent’s actions.
The weight factors are very similar to diversifying ones
portfolio; an estimation of investments made into differ-
ent utility-stocks with long term and short term options.
Utilities will be connected with weight factors that will be
proportional to the risk factor associated with the certain
utility. Also, possible changes are taken into considera-
tion when integrating all utilities over time. In a many
step game, the expected payoff from the n− th step de-
pends on the on integrating over all the risk factors over
time. The weight factor will also depend on the possibil-
ity of the maturity of an n step game. The other term
to be taken into consideration is the possibility that the
utility variable that the game is optimizing on will not
flip by the maturity of the n-step game, as with a flip,
the payoff from the game will become negative. Other
minor terms to be taken into consideration are possible
inclusions of agents in strong affinity clusters that will
distort the utility curve and shift the value of the pay-
off relative to the agent. The existence axiom must be
the most highly weighted variable, which we assume to
be fixed. The existence axiom, as defined in our previ-
ous paper, can be described in detail as an agent’s utility
in perpetuating the array of weighted variables in the
closest possible unchanged form so that the highest pos-
sible utilities are obtained from the variable, taking the
weights into account. However, when the utility fall be-
low a threshold, a variable can be updated, as the utility
is not contributing to the existence axiom then. If, taken
the flipping energies into account, a flipped variable pro-
8duces a higher than threshold utility, the flipped variable
will redefine the definition of self. Again, some variables
are connected to the self axiom with a high flipping en-
ergy threshold and also a difficult to modify large weight
factor. These are the variables that connect the agents
with the environment or nature in a material way, so that
flipping them will inevitably cease the existence axiom.
For example, eating or shelter are utilities that are very
difficult to flip, though the preference in eating might be
somewhat modifiable. So some variables that are used
for linking with nature have a high flipping energy. This
is somewhat similar to a spin system being linked to a
larger thermodynamics system where the variables are
controlled more by the larger system’s average than the
individual fluctuations of a small system connected to it.
The utility variables linked with the existence are again
optimized because they are expected to perpetuate the
existence. The existence axiom will also take into account
the coupling strengths among the variables when defin-
ing the meaning of existence. For example, the variables
inside an agent are inter-connected closely, and flipping
one of them effects other variables in the agent’s array
strongly. However, the couplings with other agents’ vari-
ables are long range, and an internal shift in an agent’s
variable will have a long range effect in other agents’ sim-
ilar variables. As a result, the idea of self is concentrated
most within the physical agent himself and fades away
as longer and longer range couplings, and also couplings
with agents with more and more dissimilar variables are
reached. Some of the weights might be easily shifted,
whereas others might have a hard shifting possibility. For
example, material needs such as food and shelter have a
high weight factor determined by nature. These weight
factors depend on the agent’s game with nature rather
than the agent’s interaction with other agents.
N. Mutations
In this term, we try to explain the possibility of the
mutation of a utility curve or preference. The mutation
term explains sudden changes in utility curves in random
agents. This sudden change occurs in individual agents
due to local interaction with nature or other external fac-
tors instead of interactions with other agents. Mutation,
hence will be a flipped spin or a new axiom connected to
the tree of an individual agent by local interactions with
nature, and may occur even when the thresholds to flip
have not been reached. Let us focus on the difference be-
tween the regular flip by reaching a threshold low utility
in the flip variable and a mutated flip. A mutated flip
will occur regardless of the current utility in that specific
variable. As a result, two things can happen:
1. The process may simply speed up a change that was
slowly taking place, or a change in utility which was hap-
pening very slowly at the cost of efficiency to the whole
system. For example, if a system is held right above the
threshold utility in a certain variable for an indefinitely
long time, naturally, there will be no flip in the variable.
However, the integration over a long time in maintaining
the variable at a value just above the threshold may be
in general more costly to the system in total energy min-
imization than a mutated flip that would reorganize the
system. We can write down the equation as
2. A mutated flip in a variable that is already opti-
mized will cost a flip in other variables or cause a huge
contradiction.
Later the change may or may not diffuse across the
network, depending on the parameters in the diffusion
network and the specific advantage against nature and
other clusters gained from adapting to the new axiom
and the cost of replacing older axioms. As a result,
the probability of a cluster undergoing sudden change
= P (mutation) + P (diffusion). The diffusion of any
mutation will be opposed by any agent with a high in-
vestment in a variable contrary to the mutated variable.
Now, the probability of the diffusion across the cluster
to other clusters will depend on the relative gain of the
mutated cluster against other clusters by holding the mu-
tated variable to themselves. When a mutated flip is
actually reducing the total efficiency of the system, a dif-
fusion will be resisted by most of the agents. Even if the
flip is increasing the efficiency of the system, diffusion will
be resisted by agents who have long term investments in
the unchanged variable. The other type of mutation is
the addition of a new axiom or preference. This new pref-
erence may or may not be contradictory to the existing
preferences.
IV. RISK AND AXIOMS
A. Risk, Insecurity and Spurious Axioms
As the agents interact with nature to find more axioms
that become fixed with nature, more axioms remain to
be found. Also, there is no such determined linear cor-
relation among knowledge, calculations and the actual
gains. In every decision, some risk factors are associ-
ated, and some of these risk factors pose minute chances
of gain against huge odds. If we examine history, most
social faith systems were created on the verge of deaths
and extreme decays of societies where large risks were re-
quired with odd gains. An agent can invent his own faith
system in order to create a virtual gain that is guaranteed
if a certain risky action is carried out.
If we look at possible futures in the point of view of the
many universe theory [10], and possible decisions with
high and low risk factors, with unknown or unexpected
results, a rational human being will always choose the de-
cision with the highest expected utility which will usually
be associated with low risk if the risk factor contains a
non diversifiable portfolio of investment such as the cost
of an agent’s life.
However, this choice of decisions may not be the best
possible choice for a system as constant low risk decisions
9must be associated with constant slow changes. However,
a high rate of change in utility may not be countered by
slow changes. As a result, high risk decisions may be re-
quired to move a system from a fast decaying utility curve
to a stabilization by adding risky pieces of knowledge.
B. Scarcity and Non Fixed Preferences
When an agent fails to meet the minimum threshold
in an unflappable axiom, he first tries rearranging the
weights so as to minimize the effect of the loss. However,
if the weight of the certain axiom is also fixed, then as a
strategy, the agent might create a spurious set of axioms
to add to the ”existence” axiom so as to keep it from flip-
ping. The spurious set of axioms might be contradictory
to the original set of axioms, and might, with time, fail to
correct for a situation where possibility of optimizing the
original utilities has been restored. Just as any other set
of axioms, the change of a spurious set of axioms will be
opposed by the agent’s tendency to maintain the status
quo.
C. Diffused Logic Systems and Inconsistency
A diffused logic system will contain diffused axioms
from both pure logic systems. However, a diffusion from
both parts will occur with a low resistance only when high
weight terms do not contain contradictions, or forcibly
one set of logic terms are chosen over the other to main-
tain consistency. However, any well developed logic sys-
tems containing many preferences based on its axioms
must allow diffusion of contradictory terms in low weight
positions as sorting and correcting inconsistencies in all
terms will take a huge amount of time and processing
power. These new logical systems may then be passed
from one generation to another as a given faith system
or a system of axioms that are inherited or taken for
granted. Over generations, the visible tags of the two
populations can get mixed to produce a homogenous pop-
ulation with an almost homogenous logic system with
contradiction only in minor low-weight terms.
The interesting phenomena occurs as with time and in-
teraction with nature and other clusters, the weights for
the preference terms need to be modified. As the spin
array with its associated weights is allowed to evolve, we
may come across phenomena where the low weight terms
ignored for inconsistency correction purposed during dif-
fusion become leading terms. This may happen due to a
sudden scarcity, or a new knowledge acquired from na-
ture.
If the weight factor is changed with leading inconsis-
tencies in a person’s logic system or in the logic system
of agents placed in the same logic pool, as the contradict-
ing axioms will tend to make macroscopic changes with
costs in entropy but leading to opposing macroscopical
changes, conflicts must arise. The magnitude of the con-
flict will depend on the agents’ perception of the weight
of the contradictory preferences.
D. Creation of New Logic Systems and New Faith
A faith system can be created by choosing a set of
axioms exclusive to the axioms already possessed by an
agent, given that the faith set of axioms do not contradict
with the existing axioms or preferences. A faith system
may carry a very high weight depending on whether it is
connected to an axiom with high flipping energy.
As an agent interacts with nature and other agents to
acquire new ”collapsed” axioms shared with other agents,
the faith system always has a chance of possessing con-
tradictions to one of the newly acquired collapsed ax-
ioms. However, since the collapsed axioms are shared by
agents in the clusters, and may be coupled to nature with
very high flipping energies, contradictions with an exist-
ing faith system may create large contradictions within
the agent’s logic system. If the faith system is coupled
with some other variables with high flipping energy, but
not shared by all members of the cluster, then the contest
between the faith axioms and the newly acquired axioms
will be subject to cluster efforts, as sharing a common
axiom will lead to strong clustering and group efforts in
maximizing utility in that certain preference axiom. Now
a faith axiom can be discarded by an agent who is able to
devise a new set of faith axioms that is not contradictory
to the agents redefined set of axioms. However, the shift
in the faith axioms must also be justified by another set
of axioms that do not tend to flip the vital axioms the
faith axioms are coupled to. In a nutshell, a substitution
of a faith axiom must be designed so as not to disturb
the agent’s value of the vital spins.
As more and more collapsed axioms are acquired, en-
tropy in nature increases. However, this leads to a more
complicated system. If there are only finitely many ax-
ioms to be acquired from nature, then after an n step
game, all the rules of the game would be acquired and
knowledge would be complete. This situation will im-
ply maximum entropy in nature, as absolute knowledge
would imply absolute knowledge of the future, and also
no choice in future moves. In any such system, no spu-
rious system of axioms can exist, as all axiom or anti
axiom will already be acquired, and hence there can be
no faith system. However,
V. DEFINING THE ENTROPY FACTOR
The entropy factor takes into account the disorder cre-
ated in the agent’s environment. Now this entropy may
not be a simple function for disjoint states. To start
with, this entropy must takes into account long range
correlations among matter. For example, an increase in
entropy at one space point may appear as an increase in
entropy at another point because of the connectedness
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of events. In a simple system where long range corre-
lations are present, often Tsallis entropy can take into
factor the corrections corresponding to the correlations.
However, an entropy associated with a more sophisti-
cated network where each of the agents are themselves
complex agents should intuitively be more complicated.
In a specific way, the entropy is the agent’s calculation in
the damage caused by either disturbing the ecosystem.
In the mathematical term, the first utility term could
also be called entropy, as an increased utility is what an
agent perceives as negative entropy. So an agent tries to
maximize negative entropy and minimize entropy. Any
action that decreases an agent’s utility is actually causing
an increased entropy. However, we have separated the
two terms for the following reasons:
1. utility may include terms that are completely non
materialistic and clauses like beliefs and faiths. These
terms may simply reflect an agent’s estimation of insecu-
rity and risk, and not the proper entropy.
2. the utility terms are weighted, and may put a
very low weight to a term that is causing a high en-
tropy change in the environment. However, optimizing
in one of the utility terms may come at the cost of sud-
denly or slowly lowering other terms. Most agents would
put a higher weight on immediate utilities than on long
term utilities because long term utilities have higher risk
factors associated with them. However, small constant
changes in the low weight entropy factor may at one point
exceed a threshold that causes other utility functions to
flip because a critical increase in entropy interferes with
the optimization of one or more vital utility factors.
So we take entropy to be a switch like function con-
nected to one or more vital utilities. The model behaves
as follows: The entropy function usually increases slowly
with any action the agent carries out. As a result, the en-
tropy term is very low compared with the agent’s other
cost functions such as energy and time spent. So en-
tropy does not play a role in an agent’s utility weights.
However, as the entropy function is connected to several
vital utility functions, so that when the entropy function
reaches a certain threshold, one or more utilities with
very high flipping cost, when total or accumulated en-
tropy reaches a warning level, some of the less vital utili-
ties are flipped to minimize the change in entropy in the
local environment. The other two things to be taken into
account here are the local and global nature of entropy
and also the time steps. Entropy can be split into two
parts, local and global. By optimizing the utilities con-
nected to the existence axiom, an agent tries to persist
longer, or decrease local entropy. In order to do that, he
must interact with nature or gain knowledge from nature.
By doing so he increases global entropy. The decrease in
local entropy must be a constant process, as the game
is played against nature, which is increased in entropy
continually, and a pause in the action will increase local
entropy. However, an action carried by an agent alone
will cause a fractional change in global entropy and will
thus have a low effect on the agent’s own local entropy. If
rate of change of global entropy as opposed to the rate of
change of local entropy due to an agent’s action is lower,
the global entropy will have a low weight in the agent’s
action, ie. An agent will do nothing to offset the cost of
the increase in global entropy caused by his action. How-
ever, small constant changes in the low weight entropy
factor may at one point exceed a threshold that causes
other utility functions to flip because a critical increase
in entropy interferes with the optimization of one or more
vital utility factors.
So we take entropy to be a switch like function con-
nected to one or more vital utilities that have a high cost
function for switching; hence, exceeding a certain value
in the entropy will require one or some of the high cost
utility functions to flip, making the agent incur a large
cost. This can be balanced by flipping several other util-
ity spins. The spins will be chosen such that the imme-
diate entropy increase can be minimized at the minimum
flipping cost. The time factor is taken into account here
because of the risk factor associated with the maturity
in any long term investment.
A. Short vs. Long-term Risk in Local and Global
Entropy
Minimization of local entropy is in many cases con-
nected with short-term gains. However, increase in global
entropy is a slow process and is associated with long term
risks. Hence, the energy invested in the minimization of
local entropy vs that in calculating the cost of global en-
tropy is that of investing in short and long term stocks. A
long term investment may or may not mature (an agent
may die), or a long term risk may be countered by other
branchings in actions and technology. The longer the in-
vestment is for, the more the chances are of the result
being affected by probabilistic changes.
B. Imposed Check in Global Entropy
A check in global entropy can be forced by associating
with the local entropy function. However, any such asso-
ciation will come with the cost of the allocating an agent’s
limited time and resources to calculating global entropy
at the cost of optimizing other local utility curves.
VI. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES CONCERNING
CLUSTERS
A. Clustering and Sub-domains in a Stable Phase
If we consider the labor market, and the division
among jobs, several factors need to be taken into account:
1. An agent’s aptitude for a job, which again depends
on a. The agent’s propensity for that skill b. Investment
made in acquiring the skill
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2. The other agents’ aptitude in measuring the skill
3. The demand for the skill This process can be sum-
marized again as maximizing the net utility of each of
the agents. However, there are several factors that are
noteworthy here:
1. Net utility is not the same as utility. When an agent
is trying to find the maximally skilled agent for a job, he
also needs to invest energy and time for the search. An
agent will try to find the most skilled for the minimal
energy spent. If an agent calculates a generalized cor-
relation among two variables, one of which is hard to
measure and the other easy, as long as the cost for ne-
glecting exceptions are calculated to be not very high, an
agent might tend to measure the easily measurable vari-
able to deduce the value of the more difficult to measure
variable. However, since each agent also is trying to max-
imize net utility, one agent’s inaccurate measurement of
a skill might reduce the total net utility of other agents
who have a demand for that skill and will share the skill.
2. An agent’s skill depends on an agent’s affinity for
a skill and also the agent’s investment in acquiring more
information to improve the skill. Again, an agent with
an affinity for a skill will need to invest less to acquire
mastery in that certain skill.
Creation of Labor Clusters and Tags: security and
Long Term Risks The resultant clusters in the labor mar-
ket might not necessarily reflect every individual with the
optimal skill at the most appropriate job sector because
of each individual’s tendency to maximize net utility and
not utility itself. Also, besides utility, we must include
a security term in entropy. The problem of security is
also very closely related to entropy and the ”existence”
axiom that we argued about in the previous paper. A
labor domain is not necessarily the same as an affinity
domain. Again, a certain skill is only one of the many
variables that can be coupled into a group. However,
many variables have no correlation with respect to games
with nature or ”quantitative” utility whereas some others
do. As a result, affinity domains and labor domains will
be two different coverings of the set of all agents. In or-
der to play successfully against nature and environment,
it is efficient to create forced clustering in skills, or trade
skills. However, the agent whose skill is important may
or may not belong to a strong affinity cluster with the
other agents in the trade. Hence, the clustering here is
”forced” on need, with obvious possibilities of betrayals
in the last step of any game.
The following equations can succinctly describe the
game: An agent will make an investment of I = f(A) +
g(tagging) + h(demand) where f(A) is a function of ap-
titude. A person with higher aptitude will need to invest
a smaller amount in order to achieve the same skill level
as a person with lower aptitude. A person with lower
aptitude may not be able to overcome a threshold in
acquiring the skill. g(tagging) is based on the tagging
barrier. An agent carrying a variable which is difficult
to flip, but acting as a tag against a certain variable will
need to invest an extra energy equivalent to the tagging
potential in order to be credible as a carrier of the certain
skill h(demand) is simply a function of demand. A skill
with higher demand will yield a high pay. Hence invest-
ing in a skill with a high pay will yield a higher degree of
freedom and more free time that can be used elsewhere.
An agent in charge of assigning a correct labor position
to the qualified agent will try to maximize gross efficiency
in terms of the minimum effort spent. The utility of the
assigner will be a function of the aptitude of the candi-
date and the difficulty in interpreting the aptitude. This
can be written as U(Assigner) = f1(u, tag). f1 is a func-
tion that is dependent both on the total aptitude of the
candidate and the difficulty in finding the aptitude. The
total utility of a person only benefiting from the labor
of an agent is U(consumer) = f2(u) − f3(cost) Where
U is only a function of the assignments of the assigned
agents. As a result a consumer will be willing to invest in
a cost term that will punish the assigner against a gross
tagging scheme that will bring down the total labor skill,
as long as the total salary paid for the skills purchased
is the same. The total utility of a competitor will be a
function of both his aptitude and the negative of tagging
against his competitor. However, when we look at the
utilities of the assigner and the consumer, we see that
tagging must go down as the aptitude of the candidates
fall far outside median mainly because of two reasons: (a)
candidates with aptitudes far outside median will be eas-
ily discernible, (b) eliminating candidates far outside the
median will bring down the total labor to the consumers
by larger amounts, and hence excluding candidates with
high aptitudes by tagging will be automatically checked
by consumers.
However, the correction terms imposed by the effects
of clustering have yet not been imposed. A further game
can be developed if we connect negotiating power of the
agents with these variables. A detailed game will be
sketched in a paper being developed.
B. Forced Clustering
Let us assume that cluster A and cluster B have two
dissimilar variables in location x, and that clustering is
created by filtering on that variable. However, let us also
assume that in both the clusters, there are two other
variables to be considered: an easily discerning variable,
y and a skill variable z. Now let us assume that there
is a weak correlation between z and y, so that agents
with y are correlated with z and is discriminated against
when skill z is considered, however, we also consider that
there is no correlation between x and z. Now any skill
is a combination of both aptitude and investment in the
skill. If cluster A is in a more economically advantageous
position, so that cluster A can pay higher for skill z, then
cluster A can cluster agents in the basis of z in cluster
B and offer higher pay to the z agents possessing y as
well. Then a forced clustering on the basis of y with the
expectation of high affinity contribution with respect to
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y will serve the purpose of cluster A, as long as y′s in
cluster A have a higher affinity for variable x than vari-
able y. Now agents from different clusters or domains
are discriminated against over the possession of a certain
variable does not mean they can naturally be forced into
a viable cluster. Agents who are expected to pay dearly
because of the forced clustering at the cost of agents un-
skilled z might as well prefer getting isolated and sell
their independent skill in z in a strict one step negotia-
tion. The other very important part here is whether a
weak correlation with the lack of skill z in agents possess-
ing y implies the existence of say a weak correlation with
skill w and a natural preference and inclination towards
that skill. In a later paper we expand in the possibility
of valuations of skills and negotiation power and design
a game based on forced clusterings of specific variables.
Also, since the y tag biased discrimination is applied to
the initial evaluation process, where the evaluator must
apply extra energy in identifying the few qualified y′s,
if the qualified y′s in cluster B get isolated and by a
higher investment than average make her skills credible,
or have an aptitude above a certain threshold, where the
z aptitude is clear, and requires little investment in iden-
tifying the aptitude, then it might be more advantageous
for an agent to not join the join the forced cluster. In
these situations, it might be efficient for agents without
y to include the minority distinct isolated agents. This
assimilation will also depend on the long term effect of
the perpetuation of the y tag. If the probability of an
agents’ perpetuating the y tag does not depend on the
agent possessing it, then there is no long term threat in
an agents’ self perpetuation by including the exceptional
y′s. However, if tag x has a correlation with the agent
possessing it, then a clustering in x will have a more long
term effect that will span generations than a clustering
in y for skill z, which will be merely a function of effi-
ciency in the investment made in isolating the skill. Now
the forcible clustering in tag y, when a clustering in x al-
ready exists will prove to be advantageous to the agents
in cluster A as long as there is no guarantee that the
variables with the highest weight factors of the incoming
y′s from cluster B are will be perpetuated in cluster A.
Again, any such assimilation of variables comes with the
usual risks of defection. When the defection is associ-
ated with the defection of easily discernible variables, at
the cost of flipping the easily flappable variables to offset
the total price, the long term risk remains the proba-
bility of the entire clusters undergoing phase transitions
in the easily flappable variables, keeping the difficult to
flip variables as the dissimilar variables, and the possibil-
ity of that dissimilar variable passing from generation to
generation.
We try to model the situation with the following equa-
tions Let us assume that f(x) > f(y) By f we mean the
filtering effect. This will happen when
1. Jijx > jijy and 2.
∑
Slxl > Slyl
(here S is the internal spin weights between nodes l
and x or y) for majority of agents.
Now let us assume that a clustering in variable x dis-
torts the preference curve of y by ǫI for agent I and a
clustering in y distorts the utility curve of agent I wrt x
by ∆I . Now if ǫI < ∆I , then a forced clustering w.r.t.
y will create sub-domains within the cluster with strong
affinities outside the y based domain.
Now let us assume that since y agents are tagged
against z, only the exceptional members of y are seen
in z, and the number is equally distributed among both
x or y, or since the tail part of a gaussian distribution of
aptitude is sparsely distributed, let us assume that there
are only few y′s in z at a certain time point which might
have equal or unequal distribution of x′s since the sample
space is small.
Now let us assume that some y′s are clustered together
based on the tag, and are forced to contribute equally to
the cluster. They are also given a quota or a proportion
of the total z labor market.
For the exceptional y′s: personal tagging cost = 0 or
very low. As a result, the equations for the exceptional
y′s are cost for imposed distorted utility contribution in
forced cluster C, cost for credibility of actual aptitude in
a forced cluster with large shared utilities = CC , cost for
extra competition in a cluster where most agents would
have been cut off from competition in the absence of the
forced clustering = Cco, cost for competing against affin-
ity clusters of competing sub-domains to force one of their
affinity agents into a predetermined quota based position
= CA, gain from being able to gain a position with lower
investment in acquiring skill = GL cost for being in the
same category as agents who has acquired the same low
skill level, and are backed by their affinity clusters = CL
cost for joining an affinity cluster based on x in order to
compete with lower skilled y′s from the competing affin-
ity clusters = CCl.
An agent with exceptional aptitude will agree to the
forced clustering situation only when all the costs of join-
ing the cluster are offset by the gain. If the y tagging is
not guaranteed to propagate to his/her progeny with a
higher probability than those with no y tagging, there is
no long-term gain from joining the forced cluster.
C. An Affinity Cluster in Peril in Terms of the
Spin Model
An affinity cluster may for many reasons be at the
point of dissolving. In his recent paper [4], Samuel Bowles
tries to explain why altruism in some agents is an evo-
lutionary stable strategy by arguing about how when at
the verge of dissolving, it is economically most advanta-
geous to leave a society, it is altruism that can keep a
society together. Again, in his book, ”The selfish gene”
Richard Dawkins [7] argues that altruism is an imposed
behavior which actually reflects the self interest of the
”selfish people” of the society. Here, we try to blend in
the modified definition of self and the affinity utility to
these ideas. (how do agents react at that point.. when
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will they leave.) Let us imagine an agent A in a clus-
ter CA at the point of dissolving. As we argued before,
as long as the agent was not a bluffing agent, and the
cluster boundaries were not drawn forcibly, the agent
will contain a reasonable amount of weighted variables
in common with the other agents: either genotypical ,
philosophical or a mixture of both. Now, let us imag-
ine that the cluster is at the point of breakdown. i.e,
let us say that most of the agents attain a negative net
utility from being in the cluster. In classical economics,
one would argue that it is economical for the agents to
leave the cluster at that point. However, here, we take
into account a few more correction terms. First of all,
to be accepted as a member of another cluster, an agent
must have or at least credibly bluff to have some variables
in common, as the ”affinity utility” of the other agents
used by the new agent must be offset an incoming affin-
ity utility. Otherwise, the common utility shared by the
agents in the cluster needs to be balanced by an incoming
trade or gain. This incoming gain in the lack of an affin-
ity term will come with the risk of betrayal at any step
and leaving the cluster. If, on the other hand, and agent
flips some variables, each flip comes with a cost. Now
the agent can leave the cluster and join another cluster
only when the total cost of flipping and making the flips
look credible to the incoming cluster is affordable. Then
again, a flip changes the credibility of the variables as
the incoming cluster gains the data about at what cost
the incoming agent is willing to flip variables and move
away. It also comes with the cost of the outgoing cluster
losing the affinity term from the deserter, and the cost of
the ”trust” factor that allowed the agent to share other
agents’ affinity points. A deserting agent signals either
a flipping or a bluffing. However, altruism is defined as
an act that is done by an agent in order to help optimize
the utility curves of other agents with no expected return.
Even, when we take the cost of flipping the variables and
the risk of losing credibility into account, the total invest-
ment made in part of the altruistic agent may actually
overweight the hidden cost incurred by simply not being
altruistic. For example, an agent may simply sacrifice his
life. There is no further step in the game for the agent
himself, and hence so no expected return. The existence
of at least a few such altruistic persons has been proved to
be an evolutionary stable strategy [4]. This phenomenon
can be described by in two ways at least in terms of our
spin model 1. In our previous paper, we described the
existence of spurious axioms. Spurious axioms may be
traded or even generated by the agent himself in order
to compensate explain any insecurity connected with the
existence axiom [1]. A spurious axiom might contain a
clause that might make the agent inclined to be altruis-
tic. A spurious axiom will be successful in over-weighting
an agent’s self perpetuation axiom only when it can pro-
pose another way of self perpetuation that is stronger
and even after weighing over the risk factors provides a
higher chance of perpetuation for longer. Hence, in the
agent’s own logical system, an agent will act completely
rationally to optimize his ”self perpetuation.” However,
since all agents do not share the same set of spurious
axioms, the act can appear as irrational to other agents.
2. The distorted idea of self can account for altru-
ism. Many models involving genes and memes have been
proposed in this regard [8, 9]. We propose a similar but
slightly modified version in terms of the spin glass model.
An agent is described as an array of variables. However,
unlike previous models, out variables in the definition of
self are weighted, and the weight factors can be modified.
The variables themselves can be flipped. Some variables
are inherited genetically and have a high flipping energy,
whereas some other variables are axioms or utilities and
faith. These can be flipped at costs dependent on the
interconnection of these variables with other variables,
and also the cost of credibility. A person will have a dis-
torted idea of self, that will take into account his own
array of variables modified by a weighted factor of other
agents possessing similar variables. An agent will try to
perpetuate his own array, and will modify the values of
the variables in his array according to the costs incurred
in order to protect the entire array. However, at cer-
tain steps the necessary modifications needed to flip the
number of variables in order to retain the integrity of
the entire array may be higher than the amount of en-
ergy and time available. At that point, the agent might
choose to invest in perpetuating similar variables in other
agents at the cost of his own array.
VII. SIMULATION OF A TOY SOCIAL
NETWORK
Let us now consider a cluster of agents {a} : a =
1, 2, ..., Na, each with the attributes {i} : i = 1, 2, ..., Ns.
Let us consider as the negative of the utility the func-
tion
H = (1/2)
∑
aij
Aaijs
a
i s
a
j+
∑
abij
Babijs
a
i s
b
j+h
∑
ai
Cais
a
i (1)
Here the superscripts a, b indicate the different agents,
and the subscripts i, j denote the particular attribute and
the state is a ”spin” state which we keep within ±smax,
to indicate the projection along a natural axis.
The A term indicates the coupling of the different at-
tributes in a particular agent, the B term stands for so-
cial interaction between different agents affecting the at-
tributes of each agent, and the C term used to represent
the interaction of with nature h of each agent with a
particular set of attributes.
Taking the derivative with respect to sai of H indicates
how a change of the attribute spin towards a more pos-
itive value will change the utility, i.e. in our simulation
we shall increase s by a unit if the derivative is negative,
and diminish it by unity if the derivative is positive:
∂H/∂sai =
∑
j
Aaijs
a
j +
∑
bj
Babijs
b
j + hCai (2)
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determines the augmentation of the spin upto smax or
its decrease upto −smax. In our case we experimented
with the A, B and C matrices, after taking the simplest
nontrivial set with Na = Ns = 3. We also added a ran-
dom component to the matrices as is appropriate in a
spin glass ([12, 13], and as one might expect in a social
context from inexplicable sources.
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FIG. 1: Orientation of attribute 1 of agent 1 as measured by
its projection along a natural axis
In Figs. 1-3 we show the time evolution of the attribute
i of agent a, i.e. of sai for three different combinations of
a and i. The other 6 possible figures are quite similar to
these three for our choice of the link matrices.
We note the interesting fact that in Fig. 1 for sa
1
we see
static phases alternating with rapid fluctuations, which
reminds one of punctuated equilibria ([14, 15]). However,
the analogy is not exact, because in our case the static
states correspond to a constrained extremum value of
the spin or the first agent’s first attribute’s orientation in
natural space.
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FIG. 2: same as Fig. 1, but for attribute 3.
In Fig. 2 we see a virtually periodic oscillation with no
sign of the small random external noise fed into the differ-
ent interactions. This corresponds to the third attribute
of the same agent, whose A and B matrix elements are
now taken to be different from those for attribute 1.
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FIG. 3: projection of agent 2’s attribute 1
In Fig. 3 we show s2
1
, i.e. the first attribute of the sec-
ond agent. Here too the orientation shows a periodic os-
cillation. But the pattern is somewhat different from Fig.
2, because there we have short static periods with alter-
nate orientations, whereas in Fig.3 we have quasi-static
orientations only in a particular direction, the oscillation
to the other direction being relatively short-lived.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this report we have outlined the possibility of de-
veloping concepts and relations related to the evolution
of social clusters, analogous to spin systems, and the im-
portance of the concept of the ”self” of each agent with
variable attributes which may be quantifiable. Simula-
tions with weight factors for different couplings between
agents and their attributes and spin-type flips in either
direction from consideration of a utility function in a sim-
ple toy system seem to show the possibility of chaos, or
at least highly aperiodic behavior, with also the possibil-
ity of punctuated equilibrium-like phenomena. It would
be interesting if the reverse process of obtaining the A
and B matrices from real data can be successfully real-
ized. However, because of the very large number of pa-
rameters available, it would probably almost always be
necessary to reduce the problem to simpler systems with
a manageable set of matrices of links, using assumptions
of fuzziness or symmetry or some other consideration.
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APPENDIX A: OVERLAPPING PERCEPTION
AND UTILITIES
Einstein spoke of an ant going on in a circle on the sur-
face of an orange and assuming that it is traveling on an
infinitely long one dimensional line. The other example
he gave was of a two dimensional being living on the two
dimensional shadow of a three dimensional object. The
knowledge of the two dimensional being will be bound by
its perception of the projection of the three dimensional
world onto that two dimensional surface. Our percep-
tions are also bound by what we can feel from the world,
and our logical system is constrained by the axioms or
information obtained by these perceptions. Now, the fact
that most human beings can communicate in a rational
manner is supported by the idea that a large portion of
these perceptions are overlapping. However, we cannot
prove within a system bound by our perception that some
portion of our perception is different from the perception
of other beings. We cannot disprove that the projections
of a higher dimensional world that we perceive are ex-
actly the same for all agents, if we are a 3-1 dimensional
world embedded in a higher dimension. The difference in
human expectations and fine understanding lead to the
idea that we are able to project slightly varied images of a
world which might be embedded in a higher dimensional
manifold.
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